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Abstract
We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model
maps traditional concepts of market power, competition and double
marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in
complex structures of intermediation, such as supply chains, trans-
portation and communication networks and financial brokerage.
We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices.
Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node
criticality as an organizing principle for understanding pricing, effi-
ciency and the division of surplus in networked markets.
JEL Classification: C70, C71, C91, C92, D40.
Keywords: Intermediation, competition, market power, double
marginalization.
1 Introduction
Supply, service and trading chains are a defining feature of the modern
economy. They are prominent in agriculture, in transport and communica-
tion networks, in international trade, in markets for bribes and in finance.
Goods and services pass through individuals or firms located along these
chains. The routing of economic activity, the earnings of individuals and the
efficiency of the system depend on the prices set by these different interme-
diaries. The aim of this paper is to understand how the network structure
of chains shapes market power and thereby determines prices and efficiency.
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To fix ideas, consider pricing in a transport network. A tourist wants
to travel on the Eurostar from London to Paris to see the Louvre. The
first leg of the journey is from Home to St. Pancras Station, using one of a
number of different services, such as taxi companies, bus services and the
Underground. Once at St. Pancras Station, the only service provider to
Paris Nord Station is Eurostar. Upon arriving at Paris Nord, there are a
number of alternatives (bus, Metro and taxi) to get to the Louvre. The
network consists of alternative paths, each comprised of local transport
alternatives in London and in Paris and a common node (the Eurostar
Company). Each of the service providers sets a price, and the traveler picks
the cheapest ‘path’. Section 2 of this paper develops a number of other
applications for which pricing in networks is important.
These examples motivate the following model. There is a source node,
S, and a destination node, D. A path between the two is a sequence of
interconnected nodes, each occupied by an intermediary. The source node,
the destination node and all the paths between them, together, define a
network. The passage of goods from source to destination generates value.
Intermediaries simultaneously post a price to get a share of this value; the
prices determine a total cost for every path between S and D. We assume
that the good moves along a least-cost path and an intermediary earns
payoffs only if she is located on it. Posted prices are the norm in transport
and communication networks. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the
pricing game.
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A node is said to be critical if it lies on all paths between S and D.
Our main finding is that criticality of nodes defines market power and,
consequently, pricing, earnings and the efficiency of economic activity in
networked markets. We now elaborate on the scope of this finding and
locate it in the context of the literature.
In the benchmark model, intermediaries know the value. We prove ex-
istence and provide a complete characterization of Nash equilibrium (The-
orem 1). For a given network, there typically exist multiple equilibria:
a) they range from efficient to inefficient (where trade breaks down com-
pletely) and b) in every efficient equilibrium, all the surplus goes either to
S and D or all of it goes to the intermediaries. The presence of critical
traders is sufficient but not necessary for intermediation rents; non-critical
intermediaries may extract rents because intermediaries on competing paths
mis-coordinate and price themselves out of contention. In the presence of
critical traders, there exist equilibria in which the entire surplus accrues to
these traders, but there also exist equilibria in which it is captured by the
non-critical intermediaries. Standard equilibrium refinements do not help us
in this situation: either they are too demanding and we face non-existence
problems, or they are insufficiently restrictive.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relation between networks and
market power, we take the model to the laboratory. Our experiments high-
light the ability of human subjects to coordinate on efficient outcomes.
They show that critical traders set high prices and extract most of the sur-
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plus. Thus, our theoretical work and experiments, taken together, establish
that the presence of critical intermediaries is both necessary and sufficient
for large surplus extraction by intermediaries and that most of the surplus
does accrue to critical traders.
In markets with multiple vertically related firms, double marginalization
is a major concern for policy and regulation; see, e.g., Lerner (1934), Tirole
(1993) and Spulber (1999).1 In our benchmark model, the number of inter-
mediaries per se has no impact on the efficiency of trade because the value
is perfectly known to all intermediaries. We extend our benchmark model
to a setting in which value is uncertain. We prove existence and provide a
complete characterization of equilibrium in this model (Theorem 2). As in
the benchmark model, there typically exist multiple equilibria. However,
the new model also exhibits important differences. Intermediaries who set
positive prices and lie on a least-cost path all set the same price; this price
and the efficiency of trade are falling in the number of intermediaries. The
multiplicity of equilibrium motivates an experimental investigation. Our
experiments highlight the impact of the length of trading chains, especially
the number of critical intermediaries, on prices and the efficiency of trade.
Our model offers a generalization of the classical models of price com-
1Double marginalization figured prominently in the Microsoft antitrust case in the
United States: it was used as an argument against splitting Microsoft into two firms,
one specializing in operating systems and the other specializing in software development
(Economides (2001)).
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petition (a la Bertrand) and the Nash demand game (Nash, 1950) to a
setting with multiple price-setting agents, in which coordination, competi-
tion and double marginalization are important. In the theoretical literature,
there has been considerable recent interest in the study of intermediation
in networks. There are, broadly, three protocols for “price” formation:
auctions (Kotowski and Leister (2012)), bargaining (Condorelli, Galeotti
and Renou (2013), Gofman (2011), Manea (2013), Siedlarek (2012), Be-
dayo, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2016)) and posted prices (Acemoglu
and Ozdagler (2007a, 2007b), Blume et al. (2007) and Gale and Kariv
(2009)). As we study a model with posted prices, our paper falls in the
third strand of work.2 There are three main differences between our paper
and the papers cited above: 1) the generality of our network framework
(which encompasses all networks and allows for incomplete information);
2) our complete characterization of equilibrium; and 3) our methodological
combination of theory and experiments. To the best of our knowledge, the
result on the role of node criticality in shaping pricing and division of sur-
2For an early paper on the relation between price and quantity competition, see
Sonnenschein (1968). For models of networks in which traders choose quantities, see
Babus and Kondor (2013), Malamud and Rostek (2013) and Nava (2010). Our paper
also broadly relates to Ostrovsky (2008), which extends the study of pairwise stability
developed in the matching literature to more general environments of trade, such as
supply chains. However, our focus on how the structure of supply chains affects market
power is very different from the questions studied in Ostrovsky (2008).
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plus is novel.3 Building upon the results in the current paper, Condorelli
and Galeotti (2016), show that node criticality is also useful for the analysis
of market power in networks, under different trading protocols (including
auctions and bilateral bargaining).
We contribute to the economic study of networks. The research on
networks has been concerned with the formation, structure and functioning
of social and economic networks; for book-length surveys, see Goyal (2007),
Jackson (2008), Vega-Redondo (2007) and Bramoulle´, Galeotti and Rogers
(2016). The problem of ‘key players’ has traditionally been studied in terms
of maximal independent sets, Bonacich centrality, eigenvector and degree
centrality; see, for example, Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2006),
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003),
Elliot and Golub (2013), Galeotti et al. (2010) and Golub and Jackson
3Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a, 2007b) consider parallel paths between the source
and destination pair. This rules out the existence of “critical” traders. Blume et al.
(2007) consider a setting with only a single layer of intermediation; this rules out co-
ordination problems and the interaction between coordination and the market power of
intermediaries. Finally, Gale and Kariv (2009) study multiple layers of intermediaries
and full connectivity across adjacent layers; this rules out “critical” traders.
We should also mention the literature on vertical relation in industrial organization the-
ory; here the focus has been on rich contractual models but within simple two layer
networks between a single upstream firm and several downstream retails (see e.g., Segal
and Whinston (2003), Nocke and Rey (2014)). By contrast, we allow for a fairly general
class of networks but restrict attention to a very simple contractual form: posted prices.
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(2010). The contribution of our paper is to show that criticality of nodes,
which is very different from “classical” measures of centrality, offers an
appropriate measure of market power.
Our paper also contributes to the large body of experimental work on
bargaining and trading in markets. Our finding on efficiency in the bench-
mark model echoes a recurring theme in economics, first pointed out in the
pioneering work of Smith (1962), and more recently highlighted in the work
of Gale and Kariv (2009). The special case of one critical intermediary
can be interpreted as a dictator game; our results on full extraction of sur-
plus stand in contrast to the general message from the research on dictator
games; see Engel (2011). The case of two critical intermediaries may be
viewed as a symmetric Nash demand game. Our experiments reveal a high
frequency of trade and equal division of surplus; these results are consistent
with those in the existing literature, such as Roth and Murnighan (1982),
Roth (1995), and Fischer et al. (2006). Charness, Corominas-Bosch and
Frechette (2007) study efficiency and surplus division with bargaining in
two-sided networked markets. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the first experimental study of chains of intermediation in networks.4 The
4There is a large sociological literature on exchange. We share with this literature
the motivation of how power may emerge in networks, but we are also interested in
questions of efficiency, and our formulation in terms of posted prices and our results are
quite different. We refer the reader to Easley and Keinberg (2010) for a survey of this
work.
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treatments involving a combination of critical and non-critical intermedi-
aries are novel relative to the literature. These treatments provide us a
first glimpse into the interaction between market power and competition in
supply chains and related environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model and discuss how a number of important questions in applications
can be studied within our framework. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark
model where value is common knowledge, while Section 4 takes up the
model with unknown value. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented
in the Appendix. Supplementary material is presented in online Appendix
A; sample instructions of experiments can be found in online Appendix B.
2 The Model
There is a source node, S, and a destination node, D. A path q between
S and D, is a sequence of distinct nodes {i1, ..., il} such that gSi1 = gi1i2 =
... = gilD = 1. The set of paths is denoted by Q. Every node i is called an
intermediary ; let N = {1, 2, 3..., n}, n ≥ 1, denote the set of intermediaries.
The nodes N ∪ {S,D} and the paths Q define a network, g.
Every intermediary i simultaneously posts a price pi ≥ 0. Let p =
{p1, p2, ..., pn} denote the price profile. The network g and the price profile
p define a cost for every path q between S and D:
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c(q, p) =
∑
i∈q
pi. (1)
Payoffs arise out of active intermediation: an intermediary i obtains pi
only if he lies on a feasible least cost path. A least-cost path q′ is one such
that c(q′, p) = minq∈Q c(q, p). Define c(p) = minq∈Q c(q, p). A path q is
feasible if c(q, p) ≤ v, where v is the value of economic ‘good’ generated by
the path. All paths generate the same value v. If there are multiple least-
cost paths, one of them is chosen randomly to be the active path. Given g,
p and v, we denote by Qv = {q ∈ Q : c(q, p) = c(p), c(p) ≤ v} the set of
feasible least-cost paths, and intermediary i’s payoff is:
pii(p, v) =
 0 if i 6∈ q, ∀ q ∈ Q
v
ηvi
|Qv |pi if i ∈ q, q ∈ Qv,
(2)
where ηvi is the number of paths in Qv that contain intermediary i. Implicit
in this formulation is the assumption that intermediaries have zero costs.5
We consider the case in which intermediaries know the value of v when
they choose their price. In this scenario, we normalize v to be equal to 1,
and, therefore, intermediary i’s profit is Πi(p) = pii(p, 1). We also examine
5It is possible to extend our analysis to cover heterogenous costs of intermediation.
Heterogenous costs will mean that generically there exists a unique path with mini-
mum total ‘cost’ of intermediaries. This path will play a role in the characterization of
equilibrium.
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the situation in which intermediaries face demand uncertainty when they set
their intermediation price. This formulation allows us to study the trade-off
between higher prices and lower volume of trade. In this case, we assume
that it is common knowledge that v has a distribution F (·) on the interval
[0, 1], with a continuously differentiable density f(·). Given network g and
price profile p, the expected payoff to intermediary i is:
Πi(p) = Ev[pii(p, v)].
We study (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the posted price game. A
price profile p∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , Πi(p∗) ≥ Πi(pi, p∗−i) for
all pi ≥ 0. An equilibrium is efficient (resp. inefficient) if trade occurs (resp.
does not occur) regardless of the realization of v. When v = 1 is known,
an equilibrium p∗ is efficient if c(p∗) ≤ 1 (resp. c(p∗) > 1); otherwise, the
equilibrium p∗ is inefficient. Under demand uncertainty, an equilibrium p∗
is efficient (resp. inefficient) if, and only if, c(p∗) = 0 (resp. c(p∗) > 1);
when c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1), we say that the equilibrium p∗ is partially efficient.
In principle, nodes that lie on many paths have more opportunities to
act as an intermediary. The betweenness centrality of a node i ∈ N is the
fraction of paths on which intermediary i lies.6 Let ηi = |{q ∈ Q|i ∈ q}|
and define betweenness centrality of intermediary i as BCi = ηi/|Q|, where
6We consider all paths and not just the shortest paths; in this, we follow Borgatti
and Everett (2006).
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BCi ∈ [0, 1]. Intermediary i is said to be critical if BCi = 1. Let BC = {i ∈
N : BCi = 1} be the set of critical intermediaries. Observe that criticality
is a property of the network per se, and is independent of the price profile.
For simplicity, we suppress the dependence of BC on g.
The model offers a general framework to study the relation between
networks and the pricing behavior of traders. We now discuss a number of
applications to illustrate the scope of the model.
2.1 Applications
1. Transportation and communication Networks: The example we
sketched in the introduction falls under the large umbrella of transportation
and communication networks (which include airlines, shipping, Internet and
cable TV). Traditionally, these sectors have been heavily regulated or under
public-sector control. The large-scale privatization in the UK (during the
1980s) was a precursor to a global trend. Now, it is common for a con-
sumer to make a choice among alternative bundles of services provided by
a number of distinct service providers. A key policy concern is the nature
of market power in these networks.7
2. Supply chains: Consider a Sony Vaio Laptop. It usually has an
Intel processor, a hard drive from Seagate Technology, Hitachi, Fujitsu or
Toshiba, RAM from Infineon or Elpida, a wireless chipset from Atheros
7Firms in communication and transportation networks use a rich set of price strate-
gies; discrimination with regard to source and destination is common.
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or Intel, an optical drive from Hitachi or Matsushita, and a graphic card
from Intel, NVIDIA or AMD. The speakers may be from HP or Sony. The
different intermediate input suppliers set prices, and Sony picks the best
combination of inputs and prices.
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) show that trade intermediation costs
amount to a significant tax on international transactions. Hummels, Jun
and Yi (2001) show that production supply chains increasingly traverse
the world and decisively shape the pattern and volume of trade. Antras
and Costinot (2011) is a recent attempt to understand international trade
with intermediaries, whereas Antras and Chor (2013) study the optimal
organization of a supply chain. The empirical significance of supply chains
motivates a systematic study of strategic pricing in general networks.
3. Corruption: The bribing of public officials for access to goods and
services and for the granting of licenses and permits is a prominent feature
of economic life in many countries. Shleifer and Vishney (1993) and Ades
and Di Tella (1999) argue that the level of bribes should be viewed as a
function of officials’ ‘market power.’ In some contexts, there is a single line
of officials (or committees) that must approve a decision, while in others,
there may exist multiple competing chains of decision makers (as on highway
tolls; Olken and Barron (2009)). These examples motivate an inquiry into
the ways that the network of decision making shapes the power of officials
in the market for bribes.
4. Intermediation in agriculture: Consider coffee. At the start, there
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is a farmer in a developing country who typically works on a small farm.
The farmer chooses from among a few intermediaries who process his cof-
fee cherries to obtain beans. These intermediaries then sell the beans to
one of the small number of exporting trading firms. The exporters sell to
dealers/brokers, who, in turn, sell to roasters (such as Nestle). The roasters
then sell to large supermarkets and local stores. Finally, consumers buy the
coffee from a retailer.
Such long chains of intermediation are common across the agricultural
sector (see, for example, Fafchamps and Minten (1999)). Historically, the
market power of intermediaries has been a major concern and has led to
large-scale state intervention in this sector. However, by the 1990s, it was
felt that state agencies discouraged innovation and the entry of new in-
termediaries, leading to a very inefficient system (see Bayley (2002) and
Meerman (1997)). Recent decades have witnessed a large-scale liberaliza-
tion of the intermediation sector. The effects of liberalization have, however,
been mixed; for a discussion, see Traub and Jayne (2008). This research
motivates a theoretical study of the determinants of pricing and division of
surplus in intermediation networks.
5. Financial Intermediation: Consider the market for municipal bonds
in the United States, which is the largest capital market for state and mu-
nicipal issuers. It has market capitalization of over $4 trillion, with daily
trading volumes of around $ 10-20 billion. Li and Schu¨rhoff (2014) show
that trading of these bonds is organized as a decentralized over-the-counter
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(OTC) broker-dealer market. The network of traders has a core-periphery
structure, with roughly 20-30 dealer firms at the core and several hundred
peripheral dealer firms (around 700 firms trade in municipal bonds in any
given month). Bonds move from the municipality through an average of six
inter-dealer trades. There is systematic price dispersion across dealers, with
dealers in the core maintaining systematically larger margins. These em-
pirical patterns motivate a theoretical study of how traders choose partners
and how the ensuing network shapes pricing margins and profitability.
In Examples 1, 2 and 3, a consumer or a firm will choose the path: it is
reasonable to suppose that the cheapest path will be picked. In Examples
4 and 5, on the other hand, the agent who owns an object will sell it to
the highest bidder downstream and has no interest in the cost of the entire
path.
The latter two examples motivate the following Bid-Ask price variant
of our model. Following Gale and Kariv (2009), suppose that every inter-
mediary i ∈ N simultaneously sets a bid and ask (bi, ai). The source S
accepts the highest bid, and the destination D buys as long as the lowest
ask price is not greater than v. The object passes from intermediary i to a
connected intermediary j with the highest bid bj, subject to the condition
that bj ≥ ai. We study this alternative model of pricing in online Appendix
A. The analysis there establishes that every equilibrium outcome in our
model is also an equilibrium outcome of the Bid-Ask model; the converse
is not true in general. However, for some important classes of networks –
15
that include trees and multi-partite networks – the equilibrium outcomes
in the two models are equivalent. So, for these networks, our equilibrium
characterization result in the benchmark model, Theorem 1, also holds for
the Bid-Ask model.
3 Complete information: Networks, market
power and efficiency
We prove existence and provide a complete characterization of Nash
equilibrium for the case in which v is known. For any given network, there
typically exist multiple equilibria with widely varying pricing, efficiency and
division of surplus. We take the model to the laboratory. The experiments
highlight two points: 1) the ability of human subjects to coordinate on effi-
cient outcomes; and 2) the role of node criticality as an important network
property for understanding market power.
We say that trader i is essential under p if he belongs to every feasible
least-cost path. Given price profile p, for path q, let c−j(q, p) =
∑
i∈q,i6=j pi,
be the total cost of all intermediaries other than j.8
8It is worth noting the distinction between essential and critical nodes. Criticality
is a property of the network per se, while essentiality is defined by the network and the
price profile together. So, a node may be essential even if there are no critical nodes in
the network: this point is taken up in the discussion on multiple equilibria below.
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Theorem 1
A. Existence: In every network, there exists an efficient equilibrium.
B. Characterization: An equilibrium p∗ is inefficient (c(p∗) > 1); or
intermediaries extract all the surplus (c(p∗) = 1); or they earn nothing
(c(p∗) = 0). Moreover,
1. p∗ is an equilibrium in which intermediaries earn nothing if, and
only if, no trader is essential.
2. p∗ is an equilibrium in which intermediaries earn all the surplus
if, and only if, (i) if trader i belongs to the least-cost path, and he
sets a positive price then trader i is an essential trader; and (ii)
if trader i belongs only to non-least-cost paths, and he belongs to
path q then c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1.
3. p∗ is an inefficient equilibrium if, and only if, if trader i belongs
to path q then c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1.
The argument for the existence of an efficient equilibrium is constructive.
First, consider a network with no critical traders. The 0 price profile is a
Nash equilibrium, as no intermediary can earn positive profits by deviating
and setting a positive price. If an intermediary sets a positive price, S and
D will circumvent him, as there exists a zero cost path without him. Next,
consider a network with critical traders. It may be checked that a price
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profile in which critical traders set positive prices that add up to 1 and all
non-critical traders set 0 price is an equilibrium.
The characterization yields a number of insights. The first observation
is that in every efficient equilibrium, intermediation costs take on extreme
values. The intuition is as follows: if the feasible least-cost path is unique,
then intermediaries in that path exercise market power; thus, if intermedi-
ation costs are below the value of exchange, an intermediary in that path
could slightly increase his intermediation price while guaranteeing that ex-
change takes place through him. In contrast, when there are multiple fea-
sible least-cost paths, there is price competition among intermediaries on
different paths. In that case, whenever intermediation costs are larger than
zero, an intermediary demanding a positive price gains by undercutting his
price. Price competition drives intermediation costs down to zero.
The second observation is on how critical traders have market power.
Observe that a critical trader is essential. Hence, the presence of critical
traders is sufficient to ensure that intermediaries extract all surplus in every
efficient equilibrium.
Criticality dictates that all surplus must accrue to intermediaries, but
the theory is permissive about how it is distributed among them. To see this
point, consider the Ring with Hubs and Spokes network presented in Figure
1, and suppose that S and D are located on (a1, d1). Then, there exists an
equilibrium in which all surplus accrues to the critical intermediaries, e.g.,
A and D charge 1/2 and all other intermediaries charge 0. However, there
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is also an equilibrium in which the entire surplus is earned by non-critical
intermediaries, e.g., A and D charge 0, B and C charge 1/2, and F and E
charge 1.
The final observation is about the multiplicity of equilibria. Consider
the ring network with six traders presented in Figure 1, and suppose that
S is located at A and D is located at D. The three equilibria described
by Theorem 1 are possible in this network: all intermediaries set price
0; all of them set price 1; and intermediaries B and C set price 1, while
intermediaries E and F set price 1/2 each. In the last case, note that E
and F are essential but not critical. Thus, criticality is not necessary for
surplus extraction by intermediaries.
This multiplicity motivates an exploration of equilibrium refinements.
We consider a number of possible refinements, including strictness, strong
Nash equilibrium, elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and coali-
tion proof equilibrium. We find that, in some cases, these refinements are
too strong; for example, there does not exist a strict or strong Nash equi-
librium in some networks. In other cases, the refinement is not effective;
for example, a wide range of outcomes (including those with coordination
failure) may be sustained under elimination of weakly dominated strate-
gies and coalition proof. We discuss these refinements in greater detail in
online Appendix A. Given the limited usefulness of standard equilibrium
refinements, we turn to an experimental investigation of posted prices in
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networks.9
3.1 Posted prices in the Laboratory
3.1.1 Experimental Design
We have chosen networks that allow us to examine the roles of coor-
dination, competition and market power. These networks are depicted in
Figure 1.
The ring networks with four, six and ten traders allow us to focus on
coordination and competition.10 For every choice of S and D, there are
always two competing paths of intermediaries. In Ring 4, for any non-
adjacent pair, there are two paths with a single intermediary each. Ring
6 and Ring 10 allow for situations with a higher (and possibly unequal)
number of intermediaries on either path.
The Ring with Hubs and Spokes network allows for a study of the impact
of market power: for instance, if S is located at a1 and D is located at a2,
9Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) consider a cooperative solution concept the kernel
in their work. They show that non-critical traders would earn 0, and critical traders
would split the surplus equally in allocations in the kernel. Our analysis above reveals
that this solution is a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game but that there exist a variety
of other equilibria.
10We have also run experiments on a ring network with eight traders. The results are
in line with those presented in this section, but to simplify exposition, we do not present
them.
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Figure 1: Networks in the benchmark design
intermediary A is a pure monopoly, while if D is b1, then the intermediaries
A and B play a symmetric Nash demand game. This network also creates
the space for both market power and competition to come into play. For
instance, if S is located at a1 and D is located at e1, then there are two
competing paths: a shorter path (through A, F , and E) and a longer path
(through A, B, C, D, and E). Traders A and E are the only critical
intermediaries.
To put these experimental variations into perspective, we summarize
the equilibrium analysis for the selected networks. In Ring 4, there is a
unique equilibrium that corresponds to the Bertrand outcome. In every
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other network, whenever there are at least two intermediaries on every
path, there exist both efficient and inefficient equilibria. This observation
motivates our first question:
Question 1: How does the efficiency of trade vary with ring size and the
presence of critical traders?
If trading does take place, Theorem 1 predicts an extremal division of
trade surplus: either intermediaries earn 0 surplus or they extract all trade
surplus. In Ring 4, the intermediation cost is 0 in the unique equilibrium;
but in all other Rings, both extremal outcomes are possible in equilib-
rium. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, whenever exchange involves crit-
ical traders, equilibrium dictates full surplus extraction by intermediaries.
These considerations motivate the second question:
Question 2: Is the division of surplus extremal? How does it vary with the
presence of critical traders?
Finally, we turn to the situation in the Ring with Hubs and Spokes where
all three forces of interest – coordination, competing paths and critical
traders – are present. Theorem 1 tells us that all surplus must accrue to
intermediaries, but it is silent on how the surplus is distributed among them.
This observation motivates our third question:
Question 3: What is the division of surplus between critical and non-
critical intermediaries?
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Session
Treatment 1 2 Total
Ring 4 16 / 240 16 / 240 32 / 480
Ring 6 18 / 180 24 / 240 42 / 420
Ring 10 20 / 120 20 / 120 40 / 240
Ring w. hubs/spokes 18 / 180 24 / 240 42 /420
Table 1: Treatments in Benchmark Model
3.1.2 Experimental procedures
We ran the experiments at the Experimental Laboratory of the Centre
for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) at University College
London (UCL) between June and December 2012. The subjects in the ex-
periment were recruited from the ELSE pool of human subjects consisting
of UCL students, across all disciplines. Each subject participated in only
one of the experimental sessions. After subjects read the instructions, an
experimental administrator read the instructions aloud. Each experimen-
tal session lasted around two hours. The experiment was computerized
and conducted using the experimental software z-Tree, developed by Fis-
chbacher (2007). Each session used one network treatment, and we ran
two sessions for each treatment. Each session consisted of 60 independent
rounds. Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental design. In each
cell, we report number of subjects/number of group observations.
We employed random matching with random assignment of network po-
sitions across rounds. In each round of a treatment, subjects were assigned
with equal probability to one of the possible positions of a network. In
Ring n, all nodes were possible positions. In Ring with Hubs and Spokes,
each spoke node was a computer-generated agent, and the remaining nodes
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were all feasible positions for the human subjects. Groups with one subject
per intermediary position were then randomly formed. The position of a
subject and the groups formed in each round depended solely on chance
and was independent of the subject’s position and the groups formed in
previous rounds, respectively.
We deliberately chose the protocol of random matching with random as-
signment. This procedure anonymized the identity of the subjects through-
out a session and, thus, helped avoid “repeated games” effects that arise if
the same fixed group of subjects play a game repeatedly. The advantage
of using subjects repeatedly under this protocol was that it allowed us to
collect a large amount of data from a given number of subjects, while they
had an opportunity to learn how to play a game. Other protocols, in which
subjects never again meet someone who they have played before require
large subject pools or provide fewer observations with less opportunity for
subjects’ learning. It is worth emphasizing that, as we only varied the
network structure, any experimental difference in subjects’ behavior across
treatments will be evidence of network effects because we kept the random
matching and assignment protocol constant across all treatments.11
For each group, a pair of two non-adjacent nodes was randomly selected
11As we shall see, our findings are in line with existing experimental literature that
shows that the random matching protocol is an effective way to minimize the repeated
games effects (Duffy and Ochs (2009)). We discuss possible repeated games effects after
we report the first finding in the next section.
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as S and D. Each pair of two non-adjacent nodes was equally likely to be
selected. All of the subjects in each group were informed of the position of
S and D in the network. All traders were informed that the surplus/value
of exchange was 100 tokens. Then, all human subjects in an intermediary
role were asked to submit an intermediation price: a real number (up to
two decimal places) between 0 and 100. The computer calculated the inter-
mediation costs across different paths. Exchange took place if the least-cost
among all paths was less than or equal to 100. If there were multiple feasible
least-cost paths then one of them was chosen at random.
At the end of the round, subjects observed all posted prices in their
group, the trading outcome, and the earnings of all the subjects. We as-
sumed that each of S and D was allocated one half of the net surplus– i.e.,
one half of 100 minus the intermediation costs. Then, the subjects moved
to the next round.
In each round, earnings were calculated in terms of tokens. For each
subject, the earnings in the experiment were the sum of his or her earnings
over 60 rounds. At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed of
their earnings in tokens. The tokens were exchanged for British pounds,
with 60 tokens equaling £1. Subjects received their earnings plus £5 show-
up fee privately, at the end of the experiment.
25
All ( ≥ 2) 2 3 4 5
1.00 1.00 -- -- --
(480) (480)
1.00 1.00 1.00 -- --
(420) (289) (131)
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(240) (49) (87) (69) (35)
0.95 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.90
(420) (126) (155) (109) (30)
Ring 10
Ring with Hubs
and Spokes
Note. The number of group observations is reported in parentheses.
Network
minimum distance of buyer-sell pair
Ring 4
Ring 6
Table 2: Frequency of Trading
3.1.3 Findings
We start by examining the efficiency of trade in networks. Table 2
reports the relative frequency of trade across different treatments.
Trade occurs with probability 1 in ring networks, regardless of their size
and of the distance between S and D. In Ring with Hubs and Spokes,
the frequency of trade is around 0.95. So, market power does not have
any significant effect on efficiency of trading. Overall, despite the need
for coordination among intermediaries along the same path, the presence of
competition between paths and the presence of market power of some inter-
mediaries, traders across all treatments are very successful in coordinating
on prices that ensure exchange.
Finding 1: The level of efficiency is remarkably high in all networks. Trad-
ing in Rings with four, six, and ten intermediaries occurs with probability
1. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, trading occurs with probability around
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0.95.
In Rings, we distinguish trading situations with respect to distances of
the two competing paths between S and D, denoted by (d (q) , d (q′)). In
Ring with Hubs and Spokes, we distinguish trading situations with respect
to (i) the number of critical intermediaries (#Cr), (ii) the number of inter-
mediation paths (#Paths), and (iii) the distance of each path (d (q) , d (q′)).
Figure 2 presents the average intermediation costs, conditional on trading,
based on the last 20 rounds, with a 95 percent confidence interval across
different trading situations.
In Table 3 of online Appendix A, we report the movement across rounds
in average intermediation costs across distinct trading situations in Rings
and Ring with Hubs and Spokes. When there are no critical traders (resp.
there are only critical traders), there is a clear downward trend (resp. up-
ward trend) in intermediation costs across rounds. The trends across rounds
reflect subjects’ learning to play the games. We interpret them as suggest-
ing that subjects learned to compete between distinct paths when there are
no critical traders, while they learned to coordinate on how to divide surplus
with only critical traders. In treatments with both critical and non-critical
traders, intermediation costs are stable over time.
We now comment on an issue that is potentially more subtle and that
can arise in our setting.12 In our experiments, subjects know that there
12We are grateful to a referee for drawing our attention to this issue.
27
is random assignment to locations across rounds. So, for instance, they
know that each of them will have a chance to occupy critical nodes. This
may lead them to be not overly concerned about the surplus accruing to
critical nodes in any specific round. Thus, the relationship between network
location and surplus could potentially be due to this repeated game effect.
A simple way to investigate this point is to examine the players’ behavior
and the division of surplus in the last round of the game. If this argument
were valid, then the allocation of surplus would be very different in the
last round, as non-critical players, for instance, might insist on a fair share
of the surplus. But Table 4 in online Appendix A shows us that there is
essentially no difference in behavior of prices in the later rounds versus the
last round. Thus, we conclude that this type of ‘repeated game’ effect is
not an issue in our experiment.
In Ring 4, intermediation costs are around five percent of the surplus. In
the other rings, intermediation costs vary between ten and twenty percent of
the surplus. The overall conclusion is that intermediation costs in all ring
networks are modest and, between the two efficient equilibria, are much
closer to the one with zero intermediation cost, especially in the smaller
rings.
In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, when S and D are served by a sole
critical intermediary, the situation is analogous to the dictator game, widely
studied in the experimental literature (for a survey, see Engel (2011)). We
find a surplus extraction of 99 percent, which is much higher than that
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Figure 2: Costs of intermediation
reported in the experimental literature. This suggests that traders located
at critical nodes in a network interpret their location as a form of ‘earned
endowment,’ in the sense of Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002). This
may give rise to a sense of entitlement that is distinct from the standard
dictator game.13
When S and D are connecting via one single path with two intermedi-
aries, the game played by the two intermediaries is analogous to a symmetric
Nash demand game. We find that intermediaries extract, in total, around
13We also note that in our design, in some situations, both S and D are computer-
generated agents, while in others, one of them is a human subject. We find no behavioral
difference across these cases. This leads us to believe that the human subject vs. com-
puter issue does not play a major role in explaining the behavior of the subjects in our
experiment.
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96 percent of the surplus and that they share it roughly equally.14 These
findings are consistent with those in the experimental literature of Nash
bargaining (e.g., Roth and Murnighan (1982) and Fischer et al. (2006)).
Finally, when there are two competing paths and critical traders, the
intermediation cost ranges between 62 percent and 83 percent. In the case
without critical intermediaries, this cost falls sharply to around 28 percent,
which is comparable to the low-cost outcome found in Rings. We summarize
this discussion in our second finding.
Finding 2: The presence of critical traders is both necessary and sufficient
for large surplus extraction by intermediaries. In Rings with four, six, and
ten traders, intermediation costs are small (ranging from 5 percent to 20
percent). In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, with critical traders, interme-
diation costs are large (ranging from 60 percent to over 95 percent).
We now turn to the issue of how surplus is divided between critical and
non-critical intermediaries. Table 3 presents the average fraction of inter-
mediation costs charged by critical traders, conditional on exchange (here,
data are grouped into the blocks of 20 rounds, due to small samples). The
number within parentheses is the number of group observations. Looking
at the last 20 rounds, we observe that 67 percent to 80 percent of interme-
diation costs go to critical trader(s). In all the cases, regardless of whether
an exchange takes place along the shorter or longer path, the number of
14See Table 3 in online Appendix A.
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1 ~ 20 21 ~ 41 41 ~ 60
0.56 0.68 0.72
(20) (26) (25)
0.48 0.56 0.67
(16) (13) (10)
0.73 0.77 0.80
(16) (19) (24)
0.65 0.67 0.74
(8) (8) (11)
Notes. The number in a cell is the average fraction of costs charged by critical traders. The
number of observations is reported in parentheses. #Cr denotes the number of critical
intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q) denotes
the length of path q beween buyer and seller.
Network (#Cr,#Paths, d(q),d(q'))
Rounds
Ring with
Hubs and
Spokes
(1, 2, 3, 5)
(1, 2, 4, 4)
(2, 2, 4, 6)
(2, 2, 5, 5)
Table 3: Surplus division among intermediaries
non-critical traders is at least as large as the number of critical traders. To
summarize:
Finding 3: In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, critical intermediaries set
higher prices and earn a much higher share of surplus than non-critical
intermediaries.
We have established that network structure – reflected in the criticality
of nodes – has powerful effects on intermediation costs and the division of
surplus. To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of competition
and market power, we now examine the pricing behavior of traders directly.
We focus on the last 20 rounds and Figure 3 depicts average prices.15
In the Ring with six and ten traders, there is tight competition between
paths. Intermediaries on a longer path choose, on average, prices somewhere
15In Online Appendix A, Table 4 reports average prices charged across rounds by
intermediaries in Rings and Ring with Hubs and Spokes, respectively.
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Figure 3: Price behavior across intermediary types
Ring 4 (2, 2) 3.99 --
(2, 4) 4.45 0.65
(3, 3) 4.01 --
(2, 8) 15.20 0.64
(3, 7) 5.30 0.68
(4, 6) 6.82 0.68
(5, 5) 5.01 --
Freq. on a shorter path|cost1 - cost2|
Ring 6
Ring 10
Notes. We report the sample median of absolute differences of two
competing paths, using the sample of last 20 rounds. The number in the last
column is the frequency of trading on a shorter path.
Network (d(q), d(q'))
Table 4: Short versus long paths
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between five and ten, independently of the distances of the two paths across
all ring networks. Responding strategically to this, intermediaries on a
shorter path choose higher prices, which were proportionate to the difference
in distance between the two paths. As a result, even when the two paths
are very asymmetric, they have very similar intermediation costs and trade
occurs frequently – roughly one third of the time –along the longer path!
Table 4 provides data on these patterns.
In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, the pricing of critical and non-critical
intermediaries is very different. Critical intermediaries post much higher
prices than non-critical intermediaries. The non-critical intermediaries post
prices that are similar to intermediaries in Rings. For instance, when there
is one critical intermediary and the two competing paths are of distance
three and five, the critical intermediary charges, on average, a price close
to 50; the only non-critical intermediary lying in the shorter path charges
a price close to 24; and the three non-critical intermediaries in the longer
path post a price around eight. Similar behavior is observed in the other
cases. This demonstrates the strong impact of network criticality on pricing
behavior and the division of surplus.
To further check the sharp differences in pricing behavior among differ-
ent types of intermediaries presented in Figure 3, Table 5 presents the re-
sults of regressions of prices on dummies for critical and non-critical traders
on a shorter path. Data are from the last 20 rounds, and we control for
individual heterogeneity by including individual subject dummies. Robust
33
standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parenthe-
ses. In Ring networks, traders on a shorter path choose significantly higher
prices than those on a longer path. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes,
critical intermediaries choose significantly higher prices than non-critical
intermediaries. The price difference between non-critical intermediaries on
short and long path is statistically significant.
Finally, while intermediation costs do take on extreme values, they de-
part significantly from the theoretical predictions. The observed departures
from equilibrium pricing and surplus extraction are consistent with a model
of noisy best response with risk aversion; a formal analysis is presented in
online Appendix A.
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4 Uncertain demand: competition and mar-
ket power
In our benchmark model, the number of intermediaries per se has no
impact on the efficiency of trade because the value of surplus is perfectly
known to all intermediaries. We now extend the benchmark model to allow
for uncertain demand. We prove existence and provide a complete charac-
terization of equilibrium in this model. As in the benchmark model, there
typically exist multiple equilibria, with very different pricing, efficiency and
division of surplus. However, the analysis also reveals important differences
with the benchmark model: active intermediaries are predicted to all set the
same price, and the number of active intermediaries has powerful effects on
pricing and the efficiency of trade. Our experiments highlight the interplay
between these theoretical predictions and the role of node criticality.
The next result proves existence and provides a complete characteriza-
tion of equilibrium, for all networks. Let e(g, p) be the number of essential
traders– i.e., the number of traders who lie on all paths q ∈ Q1. Define
h(x) = f(x)/[1− F (x)] to be the hazard rate.
Theorem 2 Assume that the hazard rate is increasing.
A. Existence: In every network, there exists an efficient or a partially
efficient equilibrium.
B. Characterization:
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1. An efficient equilibrium exists if, and only if, there are no critical
traders.
2. p∗ is a partially efficient equilibrium if, and only if, (a) there
exists some essential trader– i.e., e(g, p∗) ≥ 1; every essential
trader charges a price
pˆ∗ =
1
h(e(g, p∗)pˆ∗)
; (3)
and every non-essential trader in the least-cost path sets a price
equal to 0; and (b) if trader i belongs only to non-least-cost paths
and he belongs to path q, then c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1.
3. p∗ is an inefficient equilibrium if, and only if, if trader i belongs
to path q then c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1.
Theorem 2 brings out two important implications of pricing in networks
under uncertain demand.16 The first is that a lack of criticality is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. So, whenever
there are critical intermediaries, the equilibrium will involve some ineffi-
ciency (in the sense of lost trading opportunities). This is novel relative
to Theorem 1. The second observation relates to equilibrium pricing by
16All parts of the result, except for part [2], continue to hold if we relax the increasing
hazard rate assumption. In part [2], we exploit the increasing hazard rate assumption
for the sufficiency part of the proof only.
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essential traders: they set a unique common price that solves condition (3).
As c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1), intermediaries always share surplus with S/D.17
We now show how pricing, efficiency and division of surplus, vary with
the number of essential traders.
Proposition 1 Assume that the hazard rate is increasing. Suppose that p∗
and p′ are two partially efficient equilibria, with e(g, p∗) > e(g′, p′) essential
traders, respectively. Then:
1. The price for essential traders under p∗ is strictly lower than the price
under p′.
2. The intermediation cost under p∗ is strictly higher than under p′– i.e.,
c(p∗) > c(p′). Hence, p∗ is less efficient than p′.
3. The sum of intermediaries’ payoffs and the sum of S/D’s payoffs are
both lower under p∗ than under p′.
This proposition brings out another novel implication of pricing under
uncertain demand: recall that, in the benchmark model, there is no sys-
tematic relation between the number of essential traders and intermediation
17Observe that in case b.2 of Theorem 2, the cost of a least cost path must be interior.
It then follows, using arguments along the lines of Theorem 1, that there cannot be
multiple least cost paths. Otherwise, a trader on any one of these paths would have a
strict incentive to slightly lower her price and discontinuously raise (expected) demand
and thereby strictly raise profits.
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costs (cf. Theorem 1). In contrast, under demand uncertainty, the more
essential traders there are, the lower is the price that each charges, but the
higher is the cost of intermediation. Hence, a greater number of essential
traders leads to greater inefficiency. This follows from a classical problem
of double-marginalization. Each of the essential traders faces a downward-
slopping demand curve and has the incentive to mark up the intermediation
price above its marginal cost. An increase in the number of essential traders
reduces the mark-up charged by each intermediary, but the total interme-
diation cost must rise, because intermediaries do not fully internalize the
benefit of lowering the mark-up.
4.1 Experimental design and procedures
We study the effects of uncertain demand on pricing, the division of
surplus and efficiency of trade. In particular, we test the new theoretical
predictions on equal pricing and on partially efficient equilibrium. With
this in mind, in addition to rings of size four, six and ten and the Ring
with Hubs and Spokes, we also consider Line networks with six and eight
traders.18 Figure 4 presents these networks.
Recall that in ring networks, there always exists an efficient equilibrium,
but in rings with six and ten traders, there are also inefficient and partially
efficient equilibria. In Lines and in Ring with Hubs and Spokes (with crit-
18In the Line network with six and eight traders, the pair S and D are always the two
end nodes and computer-generated agents.
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Figure 4: Networks in the uncertain demand case
ical intermediaries), an efficient equilibrium does not exist, but a partially
efficient equilibrium does. The frequency of trade declines with the num-
ber of critical traders in this equilibrium. These observations motivate the
following question.
Question 1A: In the presence of uncertain demand, how does the effi-
ciency of trade vary with ring size and the presence of critical traders?
Our theoretical analysis reveals that in equilibrium, all essential traders
–critical and non-critical – must set the same price and that this price
declines in the number of essential traders. This motivates our second
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Session
Treatment 1 2 3 4 Total
Ring 4 16 / 240 24 / 360 40 / 600
Ring 6 18 / 180 18 / 180 36 / 360
Ring 10 30 / 180 30 / 180 60 / 360
Ring w. Hubs/Spokes 18 / 180 18 / 180 24 / 240 30 / 300 90 / 900
Line 6 16 / 240 20 / 300 36 / 540
Line 8 18 / 180 18 / 180 36 / 360
Table 6: Treatments with uncertain demand
question:
Question 2A: In the presence of uncertain demand, how does pricing vary
with network location and the number of critical traders?
4.1.1 Procedures
The experiment was run at the Experimental Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Essex (ESSEXLab; http://www.essex.ac.uk/essexlab/) in May
and October 2013. The subjects in the experiment were recruited from the
ESSEXLab pool consisting of undergraduate and Master’s students across
all disciplines at the University of Essex. The experimental procedures fol-
lowed the one we described in Section 2.3. We note that in the experiment,
the value of exchange v is randomly drawn to be an integer between 1 and
100 at the beginning of each round. Table 6 summarizes the experimental
design and treatments. In each cell, we report number of subjects / number
of group observations in a session.
4.1.2 Findings
We start with an examination of efficiency of trade. Table 7 presents
data on the frequency of trade across the different networks. We split the
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data of Ring with Hubs and Spokes with respect to the number of paths.
The cases in which there is only one path between S and D correspond
to line networks with one or two critical intermediaries. In Table 7 and
subsequent tables, we refer to these cases as Line 3 and Line 4, respectively.
We refer to all other cases as belonging to Ring with Hubs and Spokes.
Our first observation is that, for fixed a network architecture, the dis-
tance between S and D has an impact on efficiency. In the Ring network
with ten traders, the frequency of trade declines from 0.73 to 0.57 as we
move from distance 2 to distance 5. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, the
frequency falls from 0.60 to 0.45 as we move from distance 3 to distance 5.
In line networks, the frequency of trade falls from 0.65 to 0.25 as we move
from distance 2 to distance 6. Our second observation is on the effects of
critical intermediaries. For a fixed distance, the frequency of trade in a ring
network and in a line network differ considerably. The frequency of trade
in Ring with Hubs and Spokes lies somewhere between that in rings and
that in lines, for each fixed distance.
To draw out more clearly the effects of distance and the number of
critical traders on efficiency, we compare efficiency between ring networks
and line networks in Figure 5.19 We calculate the frequency of trade in ring
networks after pooling all the observations in rings with four, six and ten
traders, where the length of the shortest path between S and D is the same
19In online Appendix A, we report average intermediation costs (see table 6) and
average prices for network location (see table 5) over time and across treatments.
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Network #Paths All ( ≥ 2) 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.89 0.89 -- -- -- -- --
(600) (600)
0.73 0.74 0.69 -- -- -- --
(360) (234) (126)
0.64 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.57 -- --
(360) (108) (114) (91) (47)
0.51 -- 0.60 0.47 0.45 -- --
(504) (158) (270) (76)
0.65 0.65 -- -- -- -- --
(227) (227)
0.53 -- 0.53 -- -- -- --
(169) (169)
0.36 -- -- -- 0.36 -- --
(540) (540)
0.25 -- -- -- -- -- 0.25
(360) (360)
Line 8 1
Notes. The number of group observations is reported in parentheses. #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting
buyer and seller. The samples of Line 3 and 4 are from sessions with Ring with Hubs and Spokes.
Ring with Hubs
and Spokes
Line 3
Line 4
1
Ring 10 2
2
1
Line 6 1
minimum distance between buyer and seller
Ring 4 2
Ring 6 2
Table 7: Frequency of trade
(circles on the dotted line in Figure 5). The frequency of trade declines with
distance. We also present the frequency of trade in line networks (squares
on the solid line in Figure 5). We note that the frequency of trade is lower
at every distance level and that the gradient remains significant all the way
through. To summarize:
Finding 1A: In the presence of uncertain demand, networks have large
effects on efficiency. The frequency of trade falls with distance and falls
even more sharply with the number of critical traders.
We now turn to the pricing behavior of traders by focusing on the last 20
rounds of the experiment. We first present average prices of different types
of intermediaries in the Ring networks and the Ring with Hubs and Spokes
in Figure 6. In addition, we report in Table 8 the regression results of
prices on dummies for critical and non-critical intermediaries, respectively,
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on a shorter path. We control for individual heterogeneity by including
dummies for individual subjects. As in our benchmark experiment, there
is clear evidence that subjects responded strategically to the distances of
the two paths. Intermediaries on a shorter path chose higher prices that
appeared proportionate to the difference in distance between the two paths.
In all the networks, this difference in prices chosen by those on a shorter
path and on a longer path is statistically significant. As a consequence,
trade often occurs along the longer path.
Our next finding pertains to pricing by critical versus non-critical traders
in the Ring with Hubs and Spokes. We find that critical intermediaries
choose prices that are similar to those of non-critical traders on a shorter
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Figure 6: Pricing behavior in Rings and Ring with Hubs and Spokes
path or to all non-critical traders when the two paths are of equal distance.
In all trading cases except for the case of (#Cr, d (q) , d (q′)) = (2, 4, 6),
we cannot reject the null hypothesis either that prices chosen by critical
and non-critical intermediaries on a shorter path are equal or that critical
intermediaries choose the same price as non-critical intermediaries when
the two paths are of equal distance. These findings are in line with the
predictions of the theory.
Next, we examine the pricing behavior in Line networks. Theorem 2
(in a partially efficient equilibrium) predicts the declining patterns of prices
with distance: 50 in Line 3; 33.3 in Line 4; 20 in Line 6; and 14.3 in Line 8.
Figure 7 presents the sample average of prices with 95 percent confidence
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Ring 6
Dependent variable: price (2, 4) (2, 8) (3, 7) (4, 6) (3,5) (4,4) (4,6) (5,5)
(1) Non-critical & on a shorter path 13.436 19.086 9.017 6.977 10.492 4.511
(2.722)*** (3.725)*** (1.865)*** (2.186)*** (1.896)*** (2.678)
(2) Critical 11.318 2.840 8.598 -1.278
(1.987)*** (2.520) (1.520)*** (3.089)
Constant 28.552 7.750 10.357 1.907 6.647 7.449 7.536 9.000
(0.961)*** (0.000)*** (0.678)*** (1.700) (0.966)*** (0.360)*** (0.594)*** (0.000)***
H 0 : (1) = (2) or H 0 : (2) = 0 0.641 0.269 0.117 0.682
(p -value)
R-squared 0.338 0.387 0.349 0.312 0.326 0.345 0.223 0.376
Number of obs. 312 280 312 200 280 145 378 144
Notes: Each regression contains dummies for individual subjects. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Ring 10 Ring with Hubs and Spokes
#Cr = 1 #Cr = 2
Table 8: Regressions of pricing on network position
interval across Line networks, along with the theoretically predicted price.
As theory predicts, average prices fall with distance between S and D: 34
in Line 2; 24 in Line 3; 17 in Line 6; 13 in Line 8. However, average
prices quantitatively depart from the predictions in a manner that subjects
underprice relative to the equilibrium. The gap between empirical prices
and equilibrium prices shrinks with distance. We shall return to these
departures in the next section.
We finally turn to the empirical investigation of the theoretical predic-
tion that critical traders across different positions set a common price. We
focus on Line 6 and Line 8 networks for this analysis. Table 9 reports the
regression results of prices on dummies for network positions, using the last
20 rounds of the data. The average prices in position A of Line 6 and Line
6 networks are, respectively, about 20 and 13. The coefficients of position
dummies are not significantly far from zero, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of the equivalence of prices between any two positions in each
Line network at an usual significance level.
We summarize the pricing behavior in networks with demand uncer-
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Line 6 Line 8
Dependent variable: price (d(q) = 5) (d(q) = 7)
Constant 19.579 12.753
(0.348)*** (0.456)***
Position B 0.029 -1.030
(0.606) (0.714)
Position C -0.383 -0.588
(0.588) (0.874)
Position D 0.362 -0.006
(0.624) (0.682)
Position E -0.205
(0.709)
Position F -0.764
(0.806)
R-squared 0.200 0.190
Number of obs. 720 720
Notes: Each regression contains dummies for individual subjects. Robust standard
errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Table 9: Regressions of pricing in line network
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tainty as follows.
Finding 2A: ( i) Subjects responded strategically to the distances of two
paths. Critical traders and non-critical traders on a shorter path set similar
prices, while non-critical traders on a longer path set much lower prices.
( ii) Average prices in Line networks decline with distance, as theory pre-
dicts. However, average prices are lower than equilibrium prices; the gap
between them shrinks with distance.
5 Concluding remarks
We propose a general model of posted prices in networks. Our theoreti-
cal analysis provides a complete characterization of posted price equilibrium
for arbitrary structures of intermediation. This is a first step towards un-
derstanding the functioning of intermediated networks. Our experiments
complement our theoretical work and point to node criticality as an or-
ganizing principle for understanding pricing, efficiency and the division of
surplus in networked markets.
Our model extends naturally to the case of an arbitrary number of
source-destination pairs. The key assumption is that traders know the loca-
tion of the source-destination in the network, and can discriminate based on
this location. In some applications, traders set prices that apply uniformly
to all intermediated trades, independently of the location of the origin and
destination. An example of uniform prices are road tolls: two drivers who
48
use a bridge across a river will pay the same amount, regardless of where
they started or where they end up. This motivates the study of pricing in a
model in which the network origin and destination of trades are unknown.
In a companion paper, Choi, Galeotti and Goyal (2014), we study this
setting. We suppose that all traders simultaneously post prices: the price
that a trader sets applies to all potential trades that go through him. Once
prices are set, an S/D pair is picked at random from the set of all traders.
As before, a feasible least-cost path is selected. Given a profile of prices, a
trader faces the following trade-off. A higher price raises the payoff if trade
does take place, but it rules out long-distance trade between farther-away
S/D pairs. The theory and experiments suggest that location uncertainty
leads to breakdown of long distance trade and creates large losses in effi-
ciency.
We have assumed that all intermediaries have zero costs and that this
is common knowledge. It would be natural to examine the case in which
intermediaries have private information about their marginal costs. At a
general level, residual uncertainty about marginal costs of upstream and
downstream intermediaries leads to a trade-off similar to the one introduced
by demand uncertainty or by uncertainty of the location of source and
destination. That is, when an intermediary sets the price, he faces the
trade-off between charging a high price and obtaining a high profit, but with
low probability, or charging a low price, which leads to a low profit, but with
high probability. In an early paper, Spulber (1995) studies a setting with
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one intermediary per path; in a recent paper, Minarsch and Leister (2015)
provide partial characterization of pricing equilibrium for special classes of
networks. The analysis of pricing with asymmetric information in general
networks remains an open problem.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Existence: If C = ∅, set p∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that no intermediary
can earn positive profits by deviating and setting a positive price, because,
since there are no critical traders, there is always an alternative zero cost
path. If C 6= ∅, then consider a price profile p∗ such that p∗i = 0 if i /∈ C,
and for j ∈ C set p∗j so that
∑
j∈C p
∗
j = 1. It is easily checked that no critical
or non-critical intermediary has a profitable deviation from this profile.
Characterization: We first show that c∗(p∗) ∈ (0, 1) cannot be sustained
in equilibrium. We consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose |Q∗| = 1; in this case a trader i on q ∈ Q∗ can raise his
price slightly and strictly increase payoffs.
Case 2: Suppose |Q∗| > 1; consider a path q ∈ Q∗ and fix a trader i ∈ q
with pi > 0. Note that such a trader always exists, given that c(p
∗) > 0.
We have two possibilities:
2a: If intermediary i is essential, he can raise his price slightly and he will
remain essential as all other prices remain as before and the sum of prices
being less than 1. So there is a strictly profitable deviation.
2b: If i is not essential, given that |Q∗| > 1, the probability that i is used
in exchange is at most 1/2. If trader i lowers his price slightly, he ensures
that he is on the unique feasible least cost path. Thus the deviation strictly
increases payoff.
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Now we take up each of the remaining three possibilities with regard to
intermediation costs and characterize the conditions for which they can be
sustained in equilibrium.
1. Assume c(p∗) = 0. We first establish sufficiency. In equilibrium every
trader makes payoff 0. Consider an increase in price by some intermediary
i. As no intermediary is essential under p, there exists an alternative path
between b and s at cost 0, and this path excludes trader i. So there is no
profitable deviation, and p∗ is an equilibrium.
We now establish necessity. Suppose there is a trader i who is essential
under p∗. As c(p∗) = 0, essential trader i can raise his price slightly, still
ensure that exchange takes place through him, and thereby he strictly raises
his payoffs. So p∗ is not an equilibrium.
2. Assume c(p∗) = 1. We first establish sufficiency. Consider intermediary
j ∈ q, with q ∈ Q∗. If p∗j > 0 then intermediary j is essential and so trade
occurs with probability 1 via j and he earns p∗j . If j raises his price then
total costs of intermediation exceed 1 and no trade takes place, yielding a
zero payoff to j. If j lowers his price, trade does occur with probability 1
via him, so he only succeeds in lowering his payoff below p∗j . Next consider
trader k ∈ q with q ∈ Q∗ such that pk = 0. It is easily verified that k cannot
increase his payoff by raising his price. Finally, consider l /∈ q, ∀ q ∈ Q∗.
This trader earns 0 in p∗. A deviation to a lower positive price leaves the
trade probability via l at 0, as c−l(q′∗) ≥ 1 for all q′ such that l ∈ q′. We
have shown that p∗ is an equilibrium.
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We now establish necessity. Suppose j ∈ q, with q ∈ Q∗, p∗j > 0 and j is not
essential. So the probability that exchange occurs via trader j is at most
1/2. Trader j can lower his price slightly and this will push the probability
of trade via himself to 1, and thereby he strictly raises his payoff. Next
consider k /∈ q for all q ∈ Q∗ and suppose c−k(q′∗) < 1 for some q′ such that
k ∈ q′. Under p∗, the payoff to k is 0. But since c(p∗) = 1, there is a price
pk = 1− c−k(q′∗)−  such that, for small  > 0, the probability of trade via
k is 1 and pk > 0. This is therefore a profitable deviation.
3. Assume c(p∗) > 1. We first establish sufficiency. All traders earn 0 under
profile p∗. It can be checked that no deviation to another price can generate
positive payoffs given that c−j(q, p∗) ≥ 1, for all j and for all q ∈ Q. A
deviation to price 0 yields payoff 0. This proves sufficiency.
We now establish necessity. Suppose that c(p∗) > 1 and that there is some
j ∈ q such that c−j(q, p∗) < 1. Then there is a price pj = 1 − c−j(p∗) − ,
for some  > 0 such that trade takes place via trader j with probability 1
and pj > 0. This constitutes a profitable deviation.

Proof of Theorem 2:
Existence: If there are no critical traders in g, then existence of efficient
equilibrium follows the arguments developed in Theorem 1. If there are
critical traders then set pi = 0 for every non-critical intermediary i, and for
every critical intermediary set p∗ = 1/h(ηp∗), where η is the number of crit-
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ical players. The constructed profile satisfies part 2. Therefore there always
exists a partially efficient equilibrium in the presence of critical traders.
Characterization: The proof of Part 1 and Part 3 uses the arguments
developed in the proof of Part 1 and Part 3 of Theorem 1, and are therefore
omitted. We now prove Part 2.
First consider necessity. Suppose p∗ is equilibrium and c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1).
Take an arbitrary least cost path q ∈ Q1. Observe that every player i who
is not essential and who belongs to path q must set price 0. For otherwise,
a positive price by player i, pi > 0, is dominated by a slightly lower price
p′i < pi, that ensures the path q becomes the unique lowest cost path. This
observation and the hypothesis that c(p∗) > 0, implies that there must exist
essential players, i.e., e(g, p∗) ≥ 1, and that c(p∗) = ∑i∈E(g,p∗) p∗i .
Second, the optimal price of an essential player i ∈ E(g, p∗) solves
p∗i = arg max pi[1− F (pi + c∗−i(p∗)]. (A.1)
It is easy to see that p∗i ∈
(
0, 1− c∗−i(p∗)
)
; the first order condition then
says that for all i ∈ E(g, p),
p∗i =
1− F (c(p∗))
f(c(p∗))
.
But this implies that ∀i, j ∈ E(g, p∗), p∗i = p∗j and p∗i ∈
(
0, 1
e(g,p∗)
)
. So
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equilibrium price is given by
p∗i =
1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗)
f(e(g, p∗)p∗)
.
The existence of such a p∗ ∈
(
0, 1
e(g,p∗)
)
follows from the assumption that
f(·) and F (·) are both continuous functions and that f(0) > 0. Finally
consider an intermediary i who does not belong to any path in Q1 and
suppose that c−i(q′∗) < e(g, p∗)p∗ for some path q′ such that i ∈ q′. Then
player i can charge a price p = e(g, p∗)p∗−c−i(q′∗)− > 0 and now whenever
trade occurs it will occur via path q′; hence, this is a strictly profitable
deviation for intermediary i. The proof that these conditions are sufficient
is straightforward, given that the hazard rate is increasing.

Proof of Proposition 1: From Theorem 2 we know that in a partially
efficient equilibrium every essential player sets price, p∗i , such that:
p∗i =
1
h(e(g, p∗)p∗i )
(A.2)
where e(g, p∗) ≥ 1. The assumption of increasing hazard rate implies that
there exists a unique p∗ which solves p∗ = 1/h(e(g, p∗)p∗i ). We now prove
the three parts in the proposition.
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Part 1. Implicitly differentiating (A.2) and simplifying yields:
dp∗
de(g, p∗)
= − h
′
(e(g, p∗)p∗i )
h2(e(g, p∗)p∗i ) + h
′(e(g, p∗)p∗i )
< 0, (A.3)
where the inequality follows from the assumption of increasing hazard rate.
Part 2. Next, note that in a partially efficient equilibrium intermediation
costs are e(g, p∗)p∗i and therefore the probability that trade does not occur
is F (e(g, p∗)p∗i ). Again, implicit differentiation yields
dF (e(g, p∗)p∗i )
de(g, p∗)
= f(e(g, p∗)p∗i )
[
p∗i + e(g, p
∗)
dp∗i
de(g, p∗)
]
= f(e(g, p∗)p∗i )p
∗
i
[
1− h
′
(e(g, p∗)p∗i )
h2(e(g, p∗)p∗i ) + h′(e(g, p∗)p
∗
i )
]
> 0
where the the second equality follows by substituting the expression for
dp∗
de(g,p∗) from above, and the inequality follows from the assumption of in-
creasing hazard rate.
Part 3. The expected payoff of an essential intermediary is p∗[1−F (e(g, p∗)p∗)];
since inessential intermediaries obtain a payoff of zero, the join profits of
intermediaries are
∑
i∈N
Πi(p
∗) = e(g, p∗)p∗[1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗)], (A.4)
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and
d
∑
Πi(p
∗)
de(g, p∗)p∗
= [1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗)]− e(g, p∗)p∗f(e(g, p∗)p∗)
= [1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗)](1− e(g, p∗)) ≤ 1, (A.5)
where the second equality follows using equilibrium condition p∗ = 1/h(e(g, p∗)p∗),
and the inequality follows because in a partially efficient equilibrium e(g, p∗) ≥
1. Finally, the joint profit of S and D is
ΠS(p∗) + ΠD(p∗) = [1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗i )] [E[v|v ≥ e(g, p∗)p∗i ]− e(g, p∗)p∗i ]
=
∫ 1
e(g,p∗)p∗i
xf(x)dx− e(g, p∗)p∗[1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗i )]
(A.6)
and therefore
d[ΠS(p∗) + ΠD(p∗)]
de(g, p∗)p∗
= −[1− F (e(g, p∗)p∗i )] < 0. (A.7)

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